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The debate about informal justice, de-regulation, and popular 
justice has run into stalemate. Once again, it seems, high hopes shared 
by both left and liberal reformers have been dashed, and not just be­
cause since the advent of the Reagan administration funds from the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for the Neighbourhood Justice 
Programme have dried up. Academic criticism and negative evaluation 
has created a growing chorus of despair, a feeling that the devil of 
formal justice whom we know may after all be better than his danger­
ously unfamiliar informal brother. This chorus is occasionally punc­
tuated by an attenuated left wing squeak of hope that by some dialec­
tical feat a "genuinely" human and popular form of justice may emerge 
in spite of all from this newly identified diabolical situation (eg. 
Abel, 1982; Hofrichter, 1 9 8 2; Santos, 198O; Spitzer, 198a).*
This paper is an attempt to make that squeak a little stronger. 
I argue that the pessimism arises from a failure to distinguish 
between types of informal justice in a theoretically adequate way.
When all modes of adjudication other than the formal and professional 
are conceptually conflated the failures from a working class stand­
point are bound to outweigh the successes. Not only does this lead 
to pessimism and nihilism: it makes it impossible both to learn from 
the mistakes and to identify a direction for future efforts.
The argument here has the following form: in the next section 
the already established criticisms of informal justice institutions 
are briefly reviewed, and some additional ones put forward} following 
that the general requirements for a more adequate theory in this area 




























































































deal with professionalised justice and three main types of informal 
justice which can be empirically identified and theoretically esta­
blished; the nature of the relationship between the types is then 
considered. In conclusion it is argued that the identification of these 
types establishes provisional criteria of progress.
Before proceeding one further qualification is necessary. f
The discussion is intended to illuminate questions of informalxsm 
in advanced capitalist societies. Some of the points made may have a 
bearing on related problems in post colonial societies or in socia­
list societies, but these are not my central point of reference here, 
for theoretical reasons (see below) as well as practical ones.
The Critique of Informalism in Advanced Capitalist Societies
Critics of informal justice argue that it is unnecessary, 
that it has failed, that it is sinister, and that it is impossible. 
Let us consider these points in turn.
Felstiner (l97^) taking issue with Danzig (1973) and also 
although not explicitly with Christie (1977) argues that in complex 
and technically advanced societies people typically deal with their 
problems and resolve their disputes by avoidance or by lumping it. 
Thus elaborate, semi-off icia.1 agencies of the type proposed by 
Danzig are neither necessary nor appropriate. On the other side 
Danzig and Lowy have argued (1975) and Merry in particular (1979) 
has demonstrated that avoidance is emotionally and financially 
expensive for working class people in the United States.
This discussion was inconclusive, since improvements to 
either formal or informal systems or the abandonment of both could 
be argued from it. In the same way the argument that informal justice 
is a failure in its own terms points to no clear alternative. This 
second critique arose from evaluations of U.S. neighbourhood justice





























































































consumer protection agencies (Nader, 1980), following earlier criti­
cisms of the "unmet need" approach (e.g. Morris, 1977» Tunc, 1 9 8 1)• 
Selections from both arguments can be found in Tomasic and Feeley,
1982. It had been hoped that neighbourhood justice would be cheap,
«
would express community values, be socially integrative, non coercive, 
and individually therapeutic. The model was the post-colonial African 
community moot (Danzig, 19735 Christie, 1977)» In the event it was 
found that informal justice could cost more in time and money than 
formal adjudication, that its practitioners were middle class and 
expressed professional values, that neither the issue raised nor 
the clients of the centres were representative, courts tending to 
off load family matters and (other) "trivia", and clients being 
disproportionately black and/or female. Moreover, the fact that most 
referrals came from other social control agencies, as well as the 
class of the mediators, meant that the system was coercive, while 
any potentially therapeutic results to be derived from a refereed 
face to face encounter were lost because the procedure did not allow 
for such confrontations.
A number of other studies have discussed the co-optation or 
capture of agencies of informal justice either by various groups of 
professionals or by what Thompson (198 3) has called a professional 
laity - a group of experienced lay people of proven reliability from 
the standpoint of those who established the tribunal or other adjudi- 
f cative agency. Frost and Howard (1977) and Hetzler (1 9 8 2) have demon­
strated an alliance between chairpeople and professionals in various 
welfare tribunals in the U.K. and Sweden, which effectively inhibits 
participation by other lay members. Blegvad has made a similar point 
in relation to consumer tribunals in Denmark (Blegvad, 1 9 8 3» see also 
Eisenstein, 1979)» Dickens (198 3) has pointed to the secondary role 
played by lay members of industrial tribunals in Britain, compared 




























































































to the French system where, however, some attempts at co-optation 
have recently occured (Napier, 19795 Rogowski, I9b4).
Chairpeople are frequently appointed by or with the approval 
of the agency upon whose actions the tribunal will adjudicate, and 
carry the political advantages in the setting accruing to their role. 
Those recognised (probably by the agency to be adjudicated) as 
experts have ideological advantages best described as a legitimacy 
bonus. Thus even where lay members are regular participants they are 
at a structural disadvantage.
Like the neighbourhood justice centres, these agencies too 
fail to fulfill their own objectives as at least one official report 
(Franks, 1957) has pointed out. The voice of the person in the street 
is not heard, the criteria of adjudication are either professional 
or class biased, and the "informaLity" of the hearing itself exists 
only in comparison with the ritual of a high court. Private rules of 
procedure, evidence, and entitlement are inevitably substituted for 
the public ones which are waived.
Proposed solutions to these problems range from reaction 
(re-professionalisation), through reformist measures (representation 
by non-lawyers; legal aid to "litigants"), to despair. This lack of 
guidance towards an alternative results from the lack of a theory 
which goes beyond the structure of the specific institution(s) under 
discussion, a theory with adequate conceptual links with a general 
theory of social structure. Only such a general theory can give adequate 
guidance as to how desired changes may be achieved, and only such a 
general theory will contain within it a political morality and the 
concepts necessary for realising its vision. This is the familiar 
problem of the limitations of middle range theorising, and the neigh­
bourhood justice studies in the U.S. and the lay justice studies in 
Europe have willy nilly shared these failings, whatever the practical 




























































































None the less these studies have considerable value precisely 
because by and large they are informed by a concern for the clients 
of these institutions and have been carried out from their standpoint. 
The negative demonstration that from the standpoint of clients these 
agencies do not work may not have been sufficient in pointing to an 
alternative direction, but it has demonstrated the need, both prac­
tically and theoretically, for alternative formulations.
The third argument, that informalism is sinister, has various 
levels of complexity. Mathiesen (l9&0) and Sousa Santos (1980) for 
example, develop their analyses from complex attempts to re-formulate 
the place of law in the modern capitalist state, whereas Abel (1 9 8 1; 
1982), Garth (1982), Hofrichter (198 2), Scull (198 2), Wahrhaftig (19 8 2), 
and Winkler (undated), either presume a neo-marxist theory of the 
state, or regard states per se as dangerous. The arguments, however, 
are similar; not only has the state encouraged informal justice in 
order to solve its own political legitimacy or fiscal crises, but in 
so doing it has co-opted voluntary groups and deeply penetrated the 
social structure, taking over and transforming common sense evaluations 
and traditional patterns of relationships. Thus the apparent off-loading 
of state functions is a disguised form of state expansion. The pro­
cesses are variously characterised as absorption (Mathiesen), or the 
substitution of bureaucracy for rhetoric or violence (Santos). Some 
other authors (e.g. Winkler) see the process as a one-off response to 
a crisis of capitalism, requiring solutions of low cost and high legi­
timacy. Mathiesen and Hofrichter see the developments as part of a 
long term change in the structure of the late capitalist state; Santos 
sees bureaucracy as one among a range of control resources available 
to late capitalism, and one which is likely to be used wherever the 
shifting periphery of conflict and challenge may be located in a 
specific historical conjuncture. While Mathiesen and Santos in their 




























































































contributions to the "informalism is sinister" school of thought • 
adopt an instrumentalist position in which the question addressed 
by the analysis is "how do these institutional arrangements serve the 
needs of capital/the state?" When the question is posed in this way 
positive answers as to what might be achieved are impossible, as is 
any elaboration of the theory of the state itself, about which it is 
presumed we know already.
With the same exceptions, these arguments can be characterised 
as a form of socialist idealism, that is, they present a theoretical 
discussion of capitalism from which informalisation movements are 
somehow derived, even deduc ed. No one attempts to use the by now 
considerable range of materials about these movements to construct 
a theory.
At the other extreme, but still within the paradigm of the 
sinister, are discussions which like that of Wahraftig (1982) develop 
classifications purely in terms of a common sense understanding of 
the case material. While these are undoubtedly more illuminating than 
discussions which conflate all types of informaiism, they encounter 
the problems of middle range theorising discussed above in relation 
to the"failed in its 01m  terms" school.
In sum, the majority of writers who have seen informalism 
as sinister have been unable, because of the limitations of their 
own theoretical position, to formulate any alternative. A defensive 
formalism, following Thompson (1975) becomes the only conceivable 
tactic. As indicated, Mathiesen and Santos are exceptions in that 
the concepts they use to identify and distinguish informal structures 
can be integrally related to their theories of the total social 
structure. Thus for these authors it is only certain types of infor­
malism which are sinister. Their relative success in making these 





























































































Fourthly and finally there are those critiques of informalism 
which argue that it is impossible, that informal justice is, in the 
context of advanced capitalist societies, a contradiction in terms. 
Once again, scholars of the "impossibility" school can be divided into 
two groups. First there are those who have contributed to the trans­
ferability debate set in train by the arguments of Danzig and Christie 
(l973 and 1977 respectively, o£-at_) that the western world would bene­
fit from the importation of African models of judicial decision making 
Merry effectively concluded this debate in 1 9 6 2, demonstrating that 
the argument was based on a romantic idealisation of pre-capitalist 
(but non-feudal) forms. Contrary to this idealised view, mediation 
in such societies is typically influenced by high status people ap­
pointed to the role, it is coercive in that there are strong sanctions 
against breaches in agreements reached, and it depends on patterns of 
continuing relationships which do not exist in the capitalist indus­
trialised world. There thus exists an adequate empirical account of 
the falsity of the premises of the U.S. neighbourhood justice movement 
In Europe informalism has not shared the anthropological 
premise, although it has shared the objectives. There have been war­
nings about transferability, albeit from historical (Dawson, i960) 
perspectives, or as between advanced capitalist societies (Blankenberg 
and Reifner, 1 9 8 1). None the less Marshall (l9&^) offers a strong 
case for increased "informalism" in British criminal cases. Both 
versions, however, are vulnerable to the theoretical attack which 
argues that informal law cannot be law. As early as 1926 Pashukanis 
argued that the concept of law, like the concept of commodity, should 
be historically specific in its derivation (Beirne and Sharlet, i960). 
This plainly has relevance for the debate about transferability of 
institutions between different modes of production, discussed above. 
Moreover, Pashukanis' extended argument that law can be definitively




























































































has been elaborated in America by Medcalf (1978)» and in France by 
Edelman (l979)» who attempts a synthesis of Pashukanis1 argument with 
an Althu^erian (1 9 6 9» 197l) theory of the interpellation of the subject.
These arguments snow that law is fundamentally and inevitably des­
tructive of collectivities, so that the use of legal means to rein­
force community or neighbourhood ties involves a contradiction.
Thus informal law is a contradiction in terms, at least as 
far as the working class is concerned. In so far as it is law it is 
destructive of collectivity, the only source of countervailing power 
to capital. In so far as it is not so destructive, that is, in so far 
as it constitutes its subjects in non-individual ways, then this in­
formal procedure is not law. It must be some other form of justice 
or of social control, depending again on a class perspective.
Towards a theory of collective justice
Implicit in this critique has been the notion of what a more 
adequate and appropriate theory of collective justice would look like 
(Cain and Pinch, 1 9 8 1). Since the discussion depends upon secondary 
sources not all the criteria argued for in Cain and Pinch apply. How­
ever, four criteria can be established.
In the first place theory must be objective, by which it is 
meant that the internal relationships between the concepts must be 
consistent and logical and therefore open to scrutiny and criticism.
This is another way of saying first that the place and standing of 
the concepts is given by and in the theory, and secondly that their 
ontological status is theoretically given.
However, while a concept can only exist within knowledge it 
is also argued that the material world has and must have a role to 
play in concept and theory construction. This achieved b> the consti­
tution of "inert objects" (Cain and Pinch, 1 9 8 1) or "experiences" 




























































































theoretical/ideological "recognition". At a second stage these data 
are conceived and incorporated in a more elaborated theory.
Because of the element of the material in theory construction 
all theories are historically specific; not only are they inevitably 
thought from a specific historical site, but they incorporate data 
which must and should change with time. It is no longer novel to point 
out (perhaps Gramsci was the first to make this explicit?) that truth, 
as a timeless and ideal category, is not a proper objective for mate­
rialist theory»
As an alternative to truth, theorists as disparate as Althusser
(1976) and Habermas (l978; see also Keat, 1 9 8 1) among others have
substituted use value to the clients of the theory as a validity
criterion. This recognises that knowledges are not absolute, that they
are the political and perhaps purposeful products of groups of knowers,
and that while knowledge can never be true it can, in a standpoint
2specific way, be adjudged to be correct.
What is important, however, if the first criterion of theore­
tical objectivity is also to be met, is that the standpoints them- 
seltses are theorised as they present themselves and, if one is deve­
loping a practical politics, as they are re-constituted in terms of 
that theorisation. For the purposes of adequate theory, therefore, not 
any group or movement can present itself as a standpoint, in a nomi­
nalist way. The relationship of that group with other categories of 
the theory must also be established. The theory may of course be inter­
nally transformed as a result of this process: this seems one likely 
consequence of the development of the women's movement for the theory 
of class for example; but whether this occurs or not, the place of the 
standpoint within the theory must be given before fully adequate, 
standpoint specific, decisions about the correctness of a theory or 




























































































Knowledge then must be constructed from a standpoint which 
exists within its own theory as well as concretely. Otherwise a fully 
objective theory cannot be developed.
Finally, if a theory is to be material it cannot be construc­
ted out of ideas alone (point 2 above), nor can it seek to constrain 
the future. These again are familiar points, namely that materialist 
theories cannot be produced simply by the elaboration of theoretical 
categories, even marxist ones, and that materialist theories, while 
they must be useful for their clients - i.e. point a direction for 
future action - cannot provide fixed blue prints for a changing nistory.
In sum, the classification developed below will attempt to 
adhere to the following interrelated principles: (l) the categories
will be elaborated in such a way that they integrally relate to an 
existing theory (objectivity); (2 ) "data", i.e. in this case secondary 
source materials about actual informal justice institutions, will be 
incorporated into the theory (historical specificity); (3 ) the theory 
will be elaborated from the standpoint of a theorised, or theorisable, 
collectivity (historical specificity again, and basis for validity 
claims); (4) a direction of advance will be integral to the formu­
lation (integrity of political morality).
Types of adjudication: a materialist approach
If these criteria are accepted it becomes necessary to pro­
ceed in a certain way. First it will be necessary to establish dis­
tinctions in terms of the class of clients or intended clients of the 
agencies, or more precisely, in terms of the class categories in terms 
of which intended clients are conceived or constituted by the service 
providers. These class categories must be re-theorised in such a way 
that they form part of a general theory of social class, which itself 
is integral to a general theory of social structure. It will instantly 




























































































"privileged - underprivile^tged" relate to one dimensional conceptions 
of class, such as that of Weber (197&) or Black (1976), and form part 
of a theory of capitalism which gives theoretical primacy to equally 
uni-dimensional market relatxons. On the other hand, conceptions of 
class which emphasise qualitative distinctions, as between house peo- 
pie, the unemployed, productive workers, service workers etc. relate 
- to discontinuous and historically specific conceptions of class, such
as that of Braverman (l97^)> Marx (l95l)i Poulantzas (l975) or Wright 
(1 9 7 8» 1979)* These conceptions form part of a theory of society and
capitalism which gives theoretical primacy to productive relations. 
The later set of distinctions are used in this essay not just because 
of personal predilection, although that exists, but also because the 
first sdt do not account for differences between various agencies 
-they do not do the theoretical work that is required of them. This 
is because almost all the agencies discussed would claim that their 
purpose was to help "the poor" who are their prospective clients.
There are difficulties for both approaches in taking account 
of complexities such as that introduced by racism or sexism. It is 
argued here that a theory emphasising qualitative rather than purely 
quantitative distinctions is better able to elaborate appropriate 
categories for such complexities introduced materially at the ideo­
logical or political level. Indeed, the interventions of ideology 
and politics in the structuring and re-structuring even of white male 
“ class categories have long been recognised.
Secondly, the data: when Marx attempted, so briefly, to give 
an indication of how a class-free (or proletarian?) future would look 
he analysed the short existence of the Paris Commune (196 9)* Within 
materialist theory new institutions cannot be fantasized or imagined, 
idealist fashion,, Rather we have in mind the forms of exploitation and 
oppression which are given by our theorised experience. We therefore 




























































































the institutions of the other, but by experimentation with ways of
overcoming the forms of oppression which we know. We construct, that is,
3pre-figurative institutions.
The task of the theorist working from a working class stand­
point, therefore, is to notice these pre-figurative institutions where 
they emerge, and to identify their salient features. The aim is to 
make the concrete direction of progress that little bit more clear 
for other groups of people making similar attempts to overcome their 
experiences of oppression. It is therefore necessary to identify 
success stories, from a class standpoint. It is in the nature of these 
success stories that they will encounter problems, attract opposition, 
and be, in the main>short lived (see below pp. ). Yet the fleeting 
histories must be caught and inscribed in our political theory if we 
are to advance.**
Thirdly there is the question of standpoint. A fully correct 
theorist will speak from within the site. Others must preserve their 
organic links with the collectivity - the class - from whose stand­
point they claim to speak as best they may. But enough has already 
been said about standpoints (p.9)« The discussion demands one further 
elaboration here, its validity depends on its usefulness for the 
working class and/or women, and/or black people and their allies in 
this area of struggle. (Gramsci's term "subaltern classes" is used 
when the argument holds for all these categories).
Fourthly, the emergent theory must indicate a direction of 
advance. It does this by distinguishing and theorising the relevant 
features of the success stories so that people can learn from each 
other. As always, the evaluation of the direction implied will be 
from the standpoint of the working class, and in terms of their 




























































































Collective Justice: some success stories
Our limited knowledge of collective justice is derived from 
scattered historical and contemporary sources. Typically this has been 
repressed knowledge as Foucault has argued in both his discussion of 
repressive justice (l9/6 ) and in his discussion of popular justice 
(1980), as well as in his analysis of the intellectuals (l977)* There 
were the"Knights of Labour" trade union courts in early 20th Century 
U.S.A. (Garlock, 1982); there were the workers' offices in Weimar 
Germany (Reifner, 1982); in recent times in the United States we have 
seen the San Francisco Consumer Advice Agency (Wilson and Brydolf, 1980) 
and of course "The first law commune" (Lefcourt, 197lj pp. 310-326) 
and the civil rights and later poverty rights lawyers (Carlin, 1970; 
Cloward and Klinan, 1970; Ginger, 1972» Handler, 1978; James, 1973)»
In Britain, the law centres movement is writing its own history in 
the form of its annual reports (see also Grace, 1984 and Stevens, 1980). 
In Portugal popular courts had a brief life after the Revolution of 
1974 (Santos, 1979)* We also know about post colonial people's courts 
in Brazil,/and Chile (letswaart, 19735 Karst, 19735 Santos, 198O;
Spence, 1 9 8 2; Thome, 1 9 8 1, 1984). Ten key features can be identified
from an analysis of these agencies.
One last distinction is necessary^however^before this listing 
process can take place. Collective justice agencies exist in two modes, 
corresponding to what they seem to regard as their two tasks. These 
tasks can be identified as the maintenance of internal discipline (the 
defensive mode) and advancing the position of the collectivity they 
represent (the attacking or advancing mode). There are few examples 
in the literature of agencies which move between modes. The "Knights 
of Labour" courts described by Garlock were predominantly defensive, 
concerned primarily with questions of union solidarity ana internal 
petty crime. Similarly the "barrio" courts discussed by Karst, Santos 



























































































disputes between residents. More dramatically, Hillyard (1984) has
described the popular justice of the Provisional IRA in Ulster. Quite
clearly in the case of the "Knights of Labour" and the Provisional IRA
of the "defensive" structures
the "achrancing" mode was and is organisationally independents. In the case 
of the "barrios" this distinction is less apparent since the same 
meetings might serve many purposes.
This raises a question about the British and North American 
institutions discussed here, for these are mainly legal services 
agencies with neither official status as nor unofficial claims to be 
courts. Yet it emerges from the analysis that they are indeed sites 
of judgement, sites at which a decision is taken not just about which 
party to an action to support but about who is deserving of support, 
about who is right in a moral and political sense, and in their own 
legal sense. For these agencies, as will be seen below, the question 
of who is adjudged to be right in a conventional legal sense is not 
decisive, and rarely more than an interim objective. Because they are 
agencies in the "advance" mode, self consciously seeking new and 
better ways of achieving their objectives, because they are not simply 
reacting to, mirroring, or inverting conventional practices, but 
functioning experimentally, they are the most promising source of a 
pre-figurative model.
In the discussion of the ten definitive characteristics iden­
tified below agencies in both modes are considered together unless 
otherwise indicated.
The first characteristic of collective justice agencies is tnat 
their class identification is open and explicit, and pre-exists spe­
cific events affecting clients. This is clearest in the case of the 
two union based agencies, and in the revolutionary courts of Portugal. 
The shanty town courts of Brazil and Chile claim a community rather 
than a class base, but the communities are homogeneous in class terms, 




























































































movement has also seen the local community as its client, but in 
Brent, for example class based organisations within the community 
(the local association of trades union delegates or Trades Council, 
the tenants' associations, black people's groups) form major clients
as well as member's of the management committee (Grace, i9B4) • Other
# . .centres (eg. Lambeth) have a policy of excluding certain types of
.v client, for example, they will not act for a landlord in a dispute
with a tenant.^ Many have "closed door" policies, focusing on com­
munity rather than case-work problems. The limiting case with regard 
to this criterion is perhaps the San Francisco Consumer Agency, since 
consumers cannot be theorised as a class. For this agency class iden­
tification must be extrapolated from the actual class characteristics 
of its clients, and from tne locatxon of the agency in a working 
class area.
ii and Secondly, (ii) the client is constituted (or seen) as a
iii) collective subject. This means that (iii) the "other side" in matters 
dealt with by the agency in its "advance " mode must necessarily be 
seen in class terms also. A collective subject cannot have an indivi­
dualised, de-classed opponent. Both these characteristics of collec­
tive justice agencies derive logically and necessarily from their 
explicit class standpoint and purpose. As the Schwendingers (l9?8) 
have shown, these collective characteristics of subject and object 
are also found in feminist sites, such as rape crisis centres.
. In the "defensive" mode the client remains a collective sub­
ject - the community^a class to be protected. The other side, when 
this community has been threatened, may be individualised, as may be 
the case when two community members are in conflict. These cases differ 
from conventional practice in tneir procedures and solutions (below), 
but also because the individual is conceived concretely and politically, 
as taking his or her identity from a discursively negotiable status, 




























































































disappears and only the rule and its privileged custodians and spokes- 
people remain. The individual of collective justice in its "defensive" 
mode is a being and a human.
iv) Fourth, if the objective is to advance a class then(a) long
term and prophylactic solutions are required. The total situation 
should be prevented from occuring again: that particular experience of
oppression must be eliminated for the class as a whole to be said
to have made an advance, (b) this prophylactic function can be per­
formed negatively, by requiring some action on the part of the opposing 
class, or positively, by education. Thus all the agencies, with tne 
exception of the Latin American ones, produce newsletters, pjosters, 
have public meetings, and seek to involve clients in their work - in 
making decisions anu in contributing to the agency's understanding of 
the options. The German agencies made a point of presenting archetypal 
case histories in their newsletters so that the class basis of the pro­
blems could be understandable more readily than if discussions were 
either theoretical or based on generalisations. Thus clients are 
brought to a fuller understandxng of their own class position, and so of 
the political strategies necessary to counter the class oppression 
they experience.
v) Fifth, it again follows logically that the kind of evidence 
required for either negative or positive prevention; and for identi­
fying the class character of the issues and the opponent, are different 
from the kinds of eviuence required for adjudication in a narrower, 
individualised sense. Thus the workers in Germany found it necessary
to conduct surveys of housing conditions, industrial injuries, and so 
on. Nearer home, Brent Law Centre has commissioned studies of shopping 
intentions and practices for use in a land use struggle. San Francisco 
C.A.A. m,.de a point of aggregating individual complaints and testing 
products, so that particular producers could be identified as creating 




























































































vi) Sixth: all presenting problems are generalised empirically 
and/or theoretically. Particular instances of problems with the police, 
with landlords, with employers, with producers or retailers are ana­
lysed as well as aggregated to identify their class basis. This is
how the correct "other side" is established.
vii) Since ideal solutions will be long term and prophylactic, as 
a result of modifying the structure of class relations in the area 
in question, the seventh characteristic must be that these agencies 
do not limit themselves to tne use of established "courts" for pos­
sible solutions. This is because courts cannot offer changes in the 
structure of class relations, on however local a level, as a routine 
solution, although their decisions may under pressure or, in parti­
cular "test case" instances, affect the structure of those relations 
(Lazarson, 19 6 2) . Basically, even in aggregated actions courts do not 
recognise the same two opponents as collective justice agencies, so 
even apparently favourable decisions may leave the main problem un­
touched (Moore and Harris, 1976). And even if the solution is relevant, 
there are enforcement problems requiring continuous monitoring and 
continuous action on the part of the agency. Collective justice agen­
cies do not see a court decision as the end of a process of problem 
solving, but as an occasional stage in that process. A good example 
here is provided by the San Francisco Consumer Agency, which found
the manipulation of publicity and in extreme cases the tactic of 
picketing factories which produced faulty or dangerous products more 
effective in many instances than court actions.
Courts are therefore used in pragmatic and tactically useful 
ways. According to Pasnukanis, this was what Lenin advised ("Lenin
and the problem of Law" in Beirne and Sharlet, i960). However, the
tV»e tr





























































































viii) The eighth characteristic of these agencies is of crucial 
importance in guaranteeing their continuing collective character. 
Workers in these agencies are accountable to the collectivity (class) 
they work for. They are not accountable primarily to their individual 
clients, to the organisation which employs them, to each other as
an activist group, or to the state. This accountability guarantees 
that the collective justice agency remains organically linked, in 
Gramsci's sense (Gramsci, 197l) to the class it serves; that the intel­
lectuals (again in Gramsci's broad sense of those who theorise the 
way forward for a class) who work there do not begin to follow the 
inner logic of their own ideas, or their established and habitual 
practices, and in so doing lose touch with the concrete demands and 
experiences of those from whose standpoint they claim to speak.
Accountability structures are institutionalised in a range of 
ways. Trades union electoral patterns and constitutional structures 
themselves vary, but accountability to the class via the trades union 
movement was the objective of the "Knights of Labour" (G^rlock; 1982) 
and the workers' offices (Reifner, 19 8 2). Community based agencies 
may elect officials, or accountability may be achieved by means of a 
management committee, as in Brent, which includes as its major con­
stituent delegates from the various collective clients of the agency. • 
S.F.C.A.A. tried to realise the objective by involving clients directly 
in decision making relevant to their own problem. Adequate accounta­
bility in practice is not always achieved by these agencies, but the 
objective and the attempt is there. The criterion by which collective 
justice judges itself is adequate representation of and accountability 
to the collectivity which it serves.
ix) This accountability structure is also the guarantee of the 
validity of the emergent theory of its practices which a collective 
justice agency develops. This is the ninth definitional characteristic 



























































































from a self critical (reflexive) moral and political theory which 
itself is in a continuous process of elaboration. The purpose of the 
theory is a guide to effective collective action via adequate analysis 
of problems and past practice. The objective is not to be able to 
predict a decision, but to achieve adequate theoristion of the problem 
and to devise an adequate strategy and tactics in the light of this.
Adequacy is not an absolute criterion, but one which is decided, both
mcment to momentf r o m b y  those working on the problem and in the longer term via 
the accountability structure, in the light of a particular historical 
constellation of forces.
x) Finally, collective justice agencies experiment with forms of
internal democracy. These include de-s^ecialisation of work (so that 
each person does his or her own typing, for example), randomising the 
allocation of cases so that the most pushy, often male, do not claim 
the most interesting ones, equal pay for all staff members, collective 
decision making in which all staff (both volunteer and paid) have an 
equal voice, and client involvement in decision making (Lefcourt, 1971 
Stevens, 1980; Wilson and Brydolf, 19b0).
It is difficult at first sight to see a logical necessity for 
relationsnips of this kind. Whereas the first nine characteristics 
are, on examination, integrally related to the explicit collective 
(class) identification of the agencies, the Tenth characteristic of 
internal democracy is related rather adventitiously to tliis funda­
mental defining characteristic. It seems rather that it is separately 
derived from the moral-political theory which identifies democratic 
practice as a crucial means of overcoming - permanently - forms of 
repression and oppression which are part of a collective class ex­
perience. Thus the democracy of the internal practices of some, but 
not all, of these agencies is consistent with their more general * 
philosophy, and presumably both internal and external tensions would
19.
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A closer look, however, suggests that the logic of internal 
democracy may also be related to the accountability structure. Thus 
it becomes a necessary rather than a merely useful or correct mode 
of organisation for collective justice agencies. Sociology of orga­
nisation has over and over again demonstrated the blocking, filtering 
gate-keeping (at the least) powers of lower status members of orga­
nisations which are hierarchically ordered. Thus a hierarchic structure 
in which, for example, high status members were accountable to the 
collectivity for the practices of low status members, could not 
guarantee the overall objective, which is that each member of such 
an organisation should herself be an organic intellectual of the 
client collectivity. Democratic internal organisation recognises in 
its practices the close relationship between knowledges and powers, 
and seeks to maximise the accountability of both. This has not, how­
ever, been argued by any existing collective justice agency: rather 
the practice of internal democracy is justified as a good-in-itself 
(which it surely is), and as consistent with or an exemplar of the 
general direction of advance.
Interlude
The above ten features of collective justice can be used to 
distinguish this from other types, three of which can be identified 
from the available literature. These are professionalised justice, 
incorporated justice, and populist justice. As in the case of col­
lective justice agencies themselves, there is a more-or-less element 
in the extent to which any particualr concrete agency fits the type, 
which is an abstraction from a diverse reality. Judges in many 
European countries, such as Italy and the F.R.G. for example, are 
employed by the state throughout their career, and are promoted 
through a bureaucratic hierarchy. In Holland there is a mixed judi­




























































































half being career judges. In France the profession retains greater 
control, over training at least. It therefore becomes a question of 
judgement - both academic and political - as to whether such a system 
should be characterised as professionalised or incorporated by the 
state, or whether in fact a fifth type should be elaborated to deal 
with it.
Before proceeding to these distinctions it is important to be 
clear about the purpose they are meant to serve. The argument is that 
they are a necessary part of both defensive and offensive strategy 
for the collective justice movement. Defensively the distinctions are 
important because the legitimacy of collective justice practices is 
often challenged by the simple polemical device of conflating all 
forms of justice which are not professionalised, and therefore creating 
the possibility of attributing the very obvious faults or failures of 
these other forms to collective justice itself. Moreover, as the pen­
ultimate section of this paper describes, collective justice agencies 
are always vulnerable, are always under pressure to dissolve themselves 
into one of tne other types which are acceptable within the capitalist 
world. The distinctions developed here are intended to reveal the 
dangers inherent in such pressures, which, are usually expressed as
plausible arguments and tempting offers rather than coercion.
I
Offensively, apart from overcoming the depression resulting 
from these false analyses alluded to in the first section, the dis­
tinctions are important because they provide a temporary yard stick 
by which progress can be measured. If one or more of these characte­
ristics is missing an agency can ask itself why this is so. This 
might reveal a problem with the structure, and a direction for the 
agency's advance; or it might reveal instead some special cuaracte- 
ristic of the agency's work or of tne concrete historical setting 
within which it functions, thereby explaining its a-typical structure 




























































































which would assist other agencies with similar experiences. The dia­
gram below sets out in simplified form the characteristics which 
typically distinguish these types of agencies.
(diagram here)
Professionalised Justice
It is important to establish the ideal type of professionalised 
justice for somewhat different reasons. It does, of course, serve to 
heighten the differences between collective justice and the more fami­
liar form. This is necessary because professionalised justice is the 
form which monopolises the language of legitimacy. The discourse of 
justice is the discourse of professionalised justice, so that a demon­
stration that a collective justice agency deviates from this • form 
may be sufficient in itself to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of that 
agency. It doesn't adhere to proper rules of evidencel It treats whole 
classes of people as culpable until remedial action has been successful! 
It argues that justice must be biased in favour of those it serves 1 
How can this be justice, when we"know" that justice is something quite 
other 1 Let us then remind ourselves of this legitimate form of justice, 
and by contrasting it with collective justice reveal why its present 
structure and practices can never be fully adequate for subaltern 
class use .
I) The bourgeois class basis of professionalised justice is con­
cealed. It is hidden by an undoubtedly considerable institutional 
autonomy. This being so, the bourgeois class basis of professionalised 
justice needs to be demonstrated rather than left at the level of 
assertion. On ttie other hand, this demonstration could be a project 
in itself, and is not, therefore, appropriate within the context of this 
paper. Three points from my own work will therefore be used to indicate 
















































































































































































































































































First, I have argued (Cain, iy7^) that lawyers are the 
conceptive ideologists of the bourgeois class, and that this is the 
defining characteristic of the occupational group. This concept was 
arrived at after ethnographic work revealed that what most lawyers do 
for most clients is issue translation. By this concept is indicated 
the fact that lawyers have the task of conceiving and re-conceiving 
in more or less creative ways solutions to tne problems with wtiich 
their capitalist clients confront tnem. Thus lawyers thought of solu­
tions to the problems of the protection of capital wnich were presen­
ted to them (types of stock and share holding) as now they create 
forms of ownership appropriate to the processes of increasing concen­
tration and internationalisation of capital (unit trust companies 
for example). Thus actual and important structures and forms of orga­
nisation are created in ways thought by lawyers, managers, and exe­
cutives, - in other words, by organic intellectuals of the caxjitalist 
class (Gramsci, 1971 P»3 > Cain, The partial and apparent
autonomy of law, however, means that the trans latxon lawyers under­
take in order to resolve these very real problems of a permanently 
emerging social order must be capable of being shown to be consistent 
with pre-existing legal forms and principles. This secures automati­
cally the legitimacy of the new ideas/institutions. As Weber (l95^> 
chap. 7) noted, although his explanation was different, it is predomi 
nantly capitalists who demand creative work from lawyers and as has 
been frequently demonstated (e.g. Auerbach, 197b) tiiere is a marked 
correlation between the expansion of the legal profession and the 
rise of capitalism. The realisation tnat ideologies, forms of know­
ledge/ organisation/ power, have to be tnought of, thought for the 
first time, explains this relationship.
Secondly, I have argued (i97b) tiiat the selection and sociali 
satxon processes of barristers in England and Wales are of a kind 




























































































judiciary by rendering the bar, especially those from whom judges 
are drawn, relatively immune to alternative common sense as well as 
highly inter-subjective internally. Thus once again although it is 
in fact the autonomy of the law, or its bearers, which secures the 
purity of its link with capital described above, it is this very same 
autonomy which is deployed discursively to underpin the opposite 
argument namely that of the neutrality of legal thought and personnel. 
(The same argument is used to justify the appointment of judges as 
chairpeople of important political committees: they are allegedly 
experts in neutrality! (Abel-Smith and Stevens, 19675 Morrison, 1973» 
Cain, 1976)).
Thirdly, recent work.in first instance civil courts (Cain, 1983A 
1983 B) reveals that where creative, conceptive ideological work is 
not usually required these elaborate structural devices are not used 
to secure the autonomy of the institution. Thus plaintiffs, mainly 
agents of state or private commodity capital, very directly shape the 
practices of the court both formally - because of the presumption 
of defendant liability contained in the default procedure, and in­
formally because of the routinised nature of their relations with 
the court.
Thus, while political theorists have concerned themselves 
with securing democracy at the legislative level, and left sociolo­
gists have conversely been concerned to show that this does not exist, 
in its most secret and secreted places, in the knowledges which its 
institutional structures allow to speak and to which they give voice, 
professionalised justice can be said to be bourgeois. And it is its 
very autonomy - professionalism that by concealing this relation makes 
it possible.
ii) In systems of professionalised justice the client is con­
stituted as an individual subject, in whose individuality and intact 



























































































istics of professionalised justice reveal a logical consistency, so 
too do the characteristics of professionalised justice. For if human 
identity is carried in this inmost private place, then the notions 
both of equalising these separated identities for legally relevant 
purposed, and of achieving truth by abstracting these identities from 
their social situation, become possible (as they are not within a 
theory which sees humanness as given by social relations). Suffice 
it to say here that theorists as diverse in time and orientation as 
Pashukanis (Beirne and Sharlet, 1980) and Unger (197^) have made 
related points. Professionalised justice depends on an individualised 
notion of the subject - as - client,
iii) Professionalised justice also depends on, and constitutes,
an individualised conception of the opponent, the individual subject 
as the model of what British practitioners call "the other side".
Both parties are subjects at law in this conception, hence justice 
has no object other than itself.
iv) Fourth, solutions are usually characterised as one-off and
short term. However, this is only the character they typically present 
to the litigant who is seeking a particular "application" of the 
rules, as in most contract and tort actions. It is also the character 
they present to working class litigants, hence the insistence of col­
lective justice agencies on doing community work rather than case 
work (Carlin, 1970; Grace, 1 9 8 3; Lefcourt, 1971» Reifner, 1 9 8 2). Long 
term solutions leading to a re-structuring of relationships so as 
to prevent a recurrence of the problem, the oppressive activity can­
not be delivered by the courts to the subaltern classes, because the 
structure of the discourse in terms of which judicial decisions are 
expressed is contradictory to an emergent collective common sense or 
theory. Moreover, the subaltern class(es) as the weaker party in terms 
of any current analysis will nave continuously to struggle to guaran­





























































































And finally, of course, but it must be said, positive prophylaxis 
by means of education and organisation has no place whatever in the 
world of professionalised justice.
None the less, while in Britain the fair resolution of the 
immediate issue is Seen as the task of the courts, in the United 
States the political nature of court decisions is recognised. However; 
these more political decisions are subject to the same discursively 
inscribed limitations, from a subaltern class standpoint.
On the other hand, solutions for the clients who generated 
the legal profession as their organically related intellectual workers 
are indeed prophylactic - the joint stock company (brought about by 
statute but with the help of lawyers) prevented major losses by small
efore, only distin­
guishes professionalised from collective justice if one adopts the 
standpoint of the subaltern classes, for whan even positive solutions are 
rarely prophylatic. In Britain, certainly, class successes are more likely
to be acheived legislatively than in an adjudicative site,
v) Nules of evidence within professionalised justice are strict
and circumscribed. They serve to constitue a narrow, de-classed defi­
nition of the incident, whereas collective justice searches for an 
analysis which will indicate the correct way of conceiving the class 
structure of the incident, its status as an example of a wider cate­
gory of patterned events, professionalised justice insists upon the 
incident being dealt with in isolation (or at best in aggregated 
form) as an occasion complete in itself. It is important to realise 
that the rules of evidence are active in this respect. In legal theory 
the incident is pre-defined, exists in itself independently of these 
rules which simply state what information "about" the incident may 
be used. In the material world, on the contrary, it is tne rules of 
evidence as they are used by lawyers which ma&e the incident what it 
is, which set it up, which constitute it as an occasion without a 
relevant past, as uhique, and as complete unto itself.^ The rules
the 18th centuryinvestors in / - and long term. This criterion, therV




























































































character of professionalised justice. They therefore underpin the 
reality of its class charcter.
vi) The "other side" is constituted as an individual, and problems
or incidents, as discussed above, are detached from their social 
relations and origins. Class considerations are not allowed, although 
in certain instances gender and race considerations are accepted as 
relevant. However, sexism and racism cannot be considered by pro­
fessionalised justice unless the other side is consituted as an indi­
vidual subject. Here perhaps more clearly than elsewhere it can be 
seen how txiis constitution of both "parties" as individual subjects 
itself innibits the possible formulation of theorised collective pro­
blems. Endemic or institutionalised racism cannot be thought in the 
context of an individualised "offender", even if the individualised 
subject of the other si de is not a single person,
vii) The legitimate solutions in professional justice systems are
those which axe offered by the courts or those settlements which a 
court could support. Other means of persuading the other side are not 
allowed, or, if they take place (as in debt collecting), they are 
not recognised as existing. Innovative solutions are acceptable in 
only very limited cases, such as conditions of probation orders or, 
in Britain, "bindings over to keep the peace",
viii) Professionalised justice takes its name from this eighth cha­
racteristic, namely, the successful achievement of autonomy by an 
occupational group. Lawyers have successfully claimed a non-accountable 
status over large areas of their work. Even in the case of a career 
judiciary this may be so, with effective control being exercised by 
senior judges (Federico, 197b) . Only a lawyer can decide whether an­
other lawyer's conduct has breached the occupationally constructed 
etnical rules governing membership and practice. Lawyers set and mark 
their own entry examinations and control by informal means mobility 




























































































non deferential may find career advancement difficult (Cain, 1 9 7 6) 
while women may be marginalised in gender specifxc work roles or seg­
mented into lower status work areas (BoigtdL, 1984) . In the United 
States the bar has achieved considerable influence over appointments 
to the Supreme Court (Grossman, 1975)»
The most striking feature of the occupation is the success 
of its autonomy claims, which have achieved such widespread legiti­
macy and recognition that, both common-sensically and academically 
(see e.g. Carr Saunders and Wilson, 1933) lawyers have been regarded 
as the archetypal professionals, have provided the model from which 
early nominalist/positivist sociologies constructed their concept of 
professionals (Johnson, 1972} Cain, 1979 op. cit.) and whose arguments 
other occupational groups seeking to expand control over their job 
situation imitated in order to justify their own would be autonomy 
e.g. special relatxonship with consumers of their skill, long trai­
ning, esoteric knowledge, and so on.
As far as the legal occupation goes, the autonomy claims 
mean that the lawyer cannot be directed as to how his "professional" 
judgement should be exercised. Within the space of his or her rela- 
tionsnip with the client, the lawyer is non-accountable except to the 
occupatxon itself. The collegial, nan-hierarchic internal structure 
of the occupation reflects this ideology; assessement by peers is the 
practice, and even the formal courts in negligence matters rely heavily 
on the opinion of other workers in the same occupation. Typically, 
the organisation and administration of legal aid schemes reflects 
these autonomy claims (Zander, 1978» 1980» Zemans, 1979)»
ix) The rules governing the decisions are, it is claimed, derived
autonomously. ihis relates to the first characteristic, the fact 
that the class character of professionalised justice is concealed. 
However, the claimed autonomy is also a real structural constraint 



























































































translations and conceptive ideological work can take, and ensures 
tnat the rules do work, that is, do set limits to deviant practices and 
in so doing establish some parity of form and practice between capita­
list enterprises. The rules also work, that is, appear as fixed and 
autonomous, in relation to those people or legal persons who lack 
the resources to challenge or re-create them by means of the elabo­
rate processes established precisely in order to maintain these auto­
nomous appearances. Their side effect is to make the autonomy real!
The fact that only a member of the occupational group can address or 
interpret the rules also secures their internal consistency of logi­
cal structure which is essential to both the reality and the appea­
rance of the autonomy of the rules.
) Finally, the internal organisation of the legal occuaption is
collegial, as a result of the claim that hierarchic organisation and 
bureaucratic direction is impossible within the protected relation­
ship wita the client. Thus intra-occupational differences are those 
of status and of work segmentation rather than bureaucratic rank. On 
the other hand, ancillary workers in legal offices, whether legal 
executives or secretaries, are outside the collegial structure and 
can, therefore, be subjected to managerial direction. The position 
of assistants, younger qualified lawyers working in large law practi­
ces, is anomalous here. In terms of qualification they are members of 
the college with full status; in terms of the work place organisations 
they do not have the full status of partner, and are therefore struc­
turally junior (Smigel, 1964). In practice their work can be directed, 
altnough the general relationship with the client could not be. As
i
Smigel noted twenty years ago, the direction of change in the legal 
occupation is toward more bureaucratic structurea. The reasons for this, 




























































































Incorporated or "colonised" .justice
Incorporated justice is a form which lacks both the reality 
and the appearance of autonomy, although parts of the rhetoric of 
professionalised justice may be retained. The name derives from the 
key characteristic , which is that this is a form of adjudication 
which has been taken over by or embodied witnin either an agency of 
capital itself or an agency of the state.
How one regards the latter form is a function of the theory 
of the state which one employs. This problem is simplified here be­
cause it is only forms of justice in capitalist society which are
being examined, so that one can at least assume a capitalist form of
7the state.
i) The class basis of this form of justice may be direct as well
as overt. A good example is the Better Business Bureau (Eaton, 1980), 
a consumer organisation founded by a group of companies with, a view 
to protecting their image as well as to resolving the "reasonable" 
grievances of consumers. More frequently, however, the state mediates 
the class relations, as in Britain, F.K.G., and Scandinavia in indus­
trial relations tribunals, and in a range of agencies responsible for 
adjudicating the welfare state law (Blegvad, 1983} Farmer, 197^5 Frost 
and Howard, 1977? Hetzler, 1982; cf also Abel-Smith and Stevens, 1967)» 
Strempel (1 9 8 3) has discussed a number of similarly incorporated 
agencies in Germany; see also Bierbrauer et̂  al_, 1978. In this latter, 
mpre typical, situation which also describes a number of semi- auto 
nomous Federal Control agencies in the United States the class cha­
racter of the justice delivered is disguised in two important ways 
which have come increasingly to displace the rhetoric of professiona­
lised justice.
The first of these complex mediations of the power of capital 
was discussed briefly in the introductory section. This involves 




























































































expert in a field accord the entitlement to self legitimating know­
ledge. One's judgements are valid because one has access to a know­
ledge which renders it impossible to make an invalid judgement, al­
though a mistake, a false application of one's self legitimating 
knowledge may be possible. The position of the expert is closely re­
lated to but not isomorphic with the position of scientist. It is 
easier to have one's claims to exjjert status formally acknowledged 
if it can be argued that they are based on positivistic scientific 
knowledge, the self legitimating form of knowledge par excellence 
in the 20th Century. Non experts are more sceptical of claims based 
on experience - a problem faced by teachers, police officers, social 
workers among other occupational groups. Such workers may seek a more 
scientific theory of their jobs to underpin their claims to expert 
status. 8
The scepticism is of course well founded, for all occupations 
generate self closing knowledges - the very reason why intellectuals 
must retain organic (institutionalised) relationships with those whom 
they seek to serve as a means of preventing such knowledge closures. 
The argument, therefore, is that there should be scepticism about 
scientific knowledge too, for all expert knowledges are spcken from 
a site in the social structure, which has been created and is main­
tained by a political process. It is correct to enquire of a scienti­
fic expert also whose knowledge does he or she speak, and on whose 
behalf.
In the context of incorporated justice, however, the know­
ledges of experts are presented as neutral and incontrovertible. 
Experts are used to present decisions as the outcome of non nego­
tiable truth. Thus as Blegvad (19&3) ^as shown, the trade experts 
in consumer affairs are seen as having direct access to a knowledge 
about whether claims in the dry cleaning industry, for example, are 




























































































agency concerned is treated as having more "true" knowledge of the 
facts (Hetzler, 19&£)•
Sometimes this expert knowledge is treated not as a knowledge 
of facts but as a knowledge of policy. This was the case in the land 
use planning appeals in Northern Ireland discussed by Thompson (198 2). 
This latter seems an acceptable use of experts, consistent with collec­
tive justice. It is therefore important to secure the distinction.
When an expert presents herself as being most familiar with policy 
she is basing her claims to a better than average influence on deci­
sion making on privileged knowledge of a socially constructed reality, 
i.e. policy, b> definition the outcome of a political decision. This 
is to admit that the knowledge, or the policy from which it derives, 
could be changed as a result of a political process. The knowledge 
is not foreclosed, therefore, but is open to scrutiny and debate.
From the standpoint of democracy and collective justice, therefore, 
such ostensibly expert knowledges are acceptable.
This digression is intended to point up and emphasise the 
differences from other kinds of expert knowledge, where the claim to 
a larger than average share in decision making is based on a closed, 
allegedly true, knowledge, which is not open to debate. The political 
bases of knowledges of this kind are hidden anu denied. Thus class 
based knowledge sneaks in covertly, while incorporated justice is 
able to present itself as neutral, science based, and value free.
The second complex mediation of incorporated justice results 
from the second typical legitimacy claim, namely, to represent the 
average preson, the man (sic) in the street, the reasonable lay 
person's view. It is from this second kind of legitimacy claim that 
the confusion with collective justice arises.
State run lay justice tribunals attempt to maintain the 
appearance of a state sponsored popular court by means of their 




























































































tion whenever a capitalist state presents itself directly as repre­
senting or indirectly as ŝ jaxisoring, the collective totality, in this 
case by means of an allegedly representative selection of individuals. 
These contradictions can be listed, with the most important being 
mentioned first, but also most briefly.
A range of theories of the capitalist state from Engels'
Origin of the Family (l970) on, have variously argued but universally 
agreed that the capitalist state represents itself, and must neces­
sarily represent itself, as an abstraction serving the intrests of 
the total society, as an institution which is above or outside or which 
has means of resolving for the sake of the whole, class struggle in 
its various forms (see Jessop, 19&3)»
In order to achieve this representation endemic rifts in 
society must be denied, so no conception of classes as collectivities 
which are qualitatively and permanently different, and incapable of 
resolving/desolving into each other, could be tolerable or permitted. 
This need for denial explains the popularity of formulations which 
are consistent with a totalising state functions, i.e. continuous 
hierarchy of life chances conceptions of class, or interest group i
theories of politics.
Thus the most fundamental contradiction is that the state 
must first construct the totality which it claims to represent, and 
this construction is of course material/poxiticai as well as ideolo­
gical. The stoite, and capital which requires and constitutes it, re­
mains vulnerable, however, to alternative formulations which can be 
objects of struggle at all levels of structure, i.e. economic 
political/organisational, ana ideological.
Once the mystique of tne state is penetrated it can be seen 
as a set of interrelated institutions which collectively and separately 
are the ever changing outcome of class struggle. The forms anu prac­




























































































different constellations of class forces but, in capitalist society, 
the state as a whole is dominated by the various, often competing, 
segments and fractions of capital itself. This changes as, and only 
as, the balance of economic/political/ideological powers in the society 
is changed by political practice.
This formulation means that the precise constellation of 
class forces in any particular agency of incorporated justice will 
vary, and each will require a separate analysis. However, some ab­
stractions can be made from the studies so far carried out, and these 
reveal the contradictions peculiar to incorporated justice institu­
tions as well as some of their other characteristic features.
Frequently the mediation of the class basis of incorporated 
justice agencies is effected tnrough a lay chairpersnn. There are 
ample studies which demonstrate an alliance between chairpeople and 
experts in arriving at decisions (e.g. Frost and Howard, 1977>
Dahl, 1984; Hetzler, 198 2). Four points thus need to be made.
First, chairpeople are often appointed by a state agency,
9often too the one whose activities they are supposed to adjudicate.
Secondly, they are appointed as lay people in the very spe­
cific sense in which the state deploys this term; they are lay in the 
sense that they are not qualified lawyers nor currently employed as 
experts in the field to be adjudged. (Retired experts, apparently, 
can pass as laity, cf. Thompson, 198 2). Because they are lay in this 
sense it becomes possible for the state to claim that they represent 
the people, the person in the street etc. At the same time they are 
in fact chosen from a very limited pool of eligible people who have 
been tried, tested, and approved by various agents and agencies with­
in either the state or the direct institutions of capital (Thompson, 
1 9 8 2). Similar arguments have been put in relation to the lay magis­
tracy in Britain, although the courts in which they adjudicate are 




























































































Bankowski, 1983) other members of these agencies are variously appointed, 
but the cnair will usually have a substantial say in the matter, ana the 
other arguments as to lack of representativeness apply.
Thirdly, as discussed auove in relation to experts, members 
of lay tribunals who are neither chairpeople nor have expert status 
are typically passive. This applies also to trades union representa­
tives, who may come to the conclusion that in order to keep their 
legitimacy going - and to get re-appointed on the grounds that they 
are reasonable - they snould fight only exceptional cases, and express 
their position in terms of tne dominant discourse. Thus ordinary lay 
members rarely offer a contrary view, but limit their participation 
to making statements in support of the opinion of the chair or experts 
or officials (Blegvad, 1 9 8 3* Dickens, 19835 Hetzler, 198a). Therefore 
even if a representative panel, in a class cross-sectional sense, were 
constructed, the opinions expressed would not carry equal weight.
Certain knowledges would still be regarded as more authentic and legi­
timate txian others; and the organisational structure (role of chair) 
and even the seating arrangements (Hetzler, 198 2) would effectively 
if unofficially give the state control over possible deviant inter­
pretations ana decisions.
Fourth, there is the historical evidence that these agencies 
have been created in and through continuously waxing and waning class 
struggle (Carson, 1981; Marx, 1954 chap. 10 Section 6 ; Phillips, 1977» 
Vogler, 1984). This struggle was and is about, for example, what kinds 
of form magistrates courts (as well as other state agencies) will have, 
not simply about which class would run a pre-existing institution 
with a fixed form. When the adjudicative agencies of the welfare state 
were estabxisned in Britain it was the intention of the Labour Party 
(the then Government) to create a genuinely popular form of adjudica­
tion. That this did not occur may partly have resulted from tne fact 




























































































that time less well understood on the left: but more important than this 
theoretical failure was the political struggle concerning the structure 
of the new agencies - the main protagonists being the trades unions, law­
yers, various associations of capital anu employers, and stqte officials 
(Abel-Smith and Stevens, 1 9 6 7; Colwill, 19<34; Gough, 1979)* What was 
different about this struggle from the ibth Century and 19th Century 
struggles for the control of the magistracy was that it took place with­
in and was therefore mediated and ultimately controlled by the state.
The incorporation of these bodies as part of the state apparatus should 
therefore come as no surprise. But although the outcome of these strug­
gles was the structure just described, it was by no meqns the inevitable 
outcome and, indeed, continues in the debates about expanded legal aid, 
about legal versus informed lay representation, and so on.
ii) The other characteristics of incorporated forms of justice 
can be dealt with rather more briefly.
Clients of tne agencies - those seeking justice, or, in our 
language the subjects of it - are constituted as individuals, sometimes 
with particualr rights and always with particualr grievances.
iii) The existence of opponents in the cases is frequently denied,
for the opponent is usually the agency itself, and to recognise it as
an opponent would be to recognise, willy nilly, the clients of the
agency as a single category of people; a collecitivity if not a class,
and certainly not as a set of isolated individuals with particular
justice
grievances or claims. Thus incorporated/typically denies the existence 
of its object. And in extreme cases, merging on the populist form, this 
denial makes possible a complete inversion of the subject and object of 
justice. In such cases the agency itself a±pears as subject and the 
client/subject as the victim of accused -effectively the object. The 
broad nature of the evidence about the client which is regarded as rele­





























































































possible (see iv and v below).
iv) This individualisation of the client and denial of the opponent
means that the incident itself which gives rise to the judgement situa­
tion can only be constituted in a limited number of ways. Two or three 
theories of the origin of sucn incidents are possible. One is that 
there has been a well intentioned mistake by a junior employee; anotner 
is tnat there has been a malign mistake by such a low level employee, 
but that he or she is an a-typical example of employees in general 
whose example may or may not have been followed (tiie rotten apple 
theory); another is that the client did not put the initial case well 
enough, clearly enough etc. (blaming the victim). Such arguments allow 
these agencies to grant a minority (Frost and Howard, 1977) of claims, 
without conceding that there is any fundamental problem with the 
defendant agency (as it should surely be from a collective standpoint) 
itself.
When claims are being denied it is typical to displace and 
deny the originating incident altogether, so that the client of the 
agency is seen as having been unreasonable, as having, that is, made 
a "normal" event into an incident.
This is discursively necessary because as there could be only 
one conceivable opponent (if any opponent were admitted) so a decision 
that someone else was responsible is not possible. The decision must 
be either that there was an error on the part of the agency's staff, 
that the client/victim misunderstood and that no incident in fact took 
place, or a combination of these, such as an argument that the de­
meanour of the client contributed to the agency's error.
v) Justice agencies which have been incorporated tend to demand
two types of evidence, and again this requirement is related to the 
other characteristics of incorporated justice. As regards the alleged 




























































































Danish dry cleaning instance, Blegvad, 19 8 3) there are occasions when 
expert testimony may be invoked. None the less, evidence is customa­
rily admitted only about the single incident under discussion. No 
broad review of product reliability or officials' practices could be 
introduced as evidence relevant to the matter in hand.
As regards the characteristics of the client (or claimant), 
however, different evidential practices are involved. Here it becomes 
possible for the agency to examine a broad range of background cnarac 
teristics in order to determine whether or not the claim is likely to 
be deserved. The record of past contacts with the agency, appearing 
like all records to represent facts, but in reality compiled bj the 
agency in terms of their relevancies, and representing their construe 
tion of events, is an important factor in this characterological > 
re-construction.
Thus incorporated justice agencies can be said in general to 
apply strict rules of evidence to the incident but broad, and largely 
implicit, rules to the client.
vi) Incorporated justice agencies do not claim to be an alterna­
tive to the standard forms of professionalised justice most typically 
found in capitalist societies. Rather they see themselves and are re­
garded, as complementary to the professionalised form. Thus it is 
quite possible for these agencies to maintain quite formal links 
with professionalised state courts. In the U.S.A. cases are referred 
to neighbourhood justice agencies by formal courts (Danzig, 1973» 
Tomasic, 19 8 2), and this was built into the theory of these institu­
tions, although the relation is also partly responsible for their 
failure to realise their objective. In Britain decisions of welfare 
tribunals may on specified grounds, be appealed in professionalised 
state courts. In West Germany certain informal adjudication settings 
have been established fully within the professionalised state court 





























































































and county court arbitrations also are in the U.K. Other agencies run 
in parallel to professionalised state courts: the various consumer 
agencies such as the consumer council in Britain and the Better 
Business Bureau (Baton, 1980) in the U.S.A., as well as the Danish 
consumer agency, adjudicate matters which fall within the jurisdiction 
of professionalised state courts, such as contract and tort questions. 
In most cases the professionalised court remains an alternative site 
in which the matter could be adjudicated - appeals on procedural 
grounds, for example, could usually be taken there. Some agencies, 
however, demand that the litigants agree in advance to abide by the 
decision of the agency, that is, not to re-open the substantive ques­
tions in another setting.
The general picture then of relations between incorporated 
justice agencies and professionalised state courts is one of reci­
procal legitimation and lack of competition, with the JP.S.C.'s being 
accorded senior place. This relation is the same whether the incorpo­
rated justice agency is in fact itself a state agency, or whether it 
has been incorporated directly by capital.
Incorporated justice agencies have no prophylactic concerns 
but limit themselves to the resolution of the particular case. This 
is Nader's criticism of a range of consumer protection agencies in the 
U.S.A. (Nader, 1980) and also the criticism that the welfare rights 
advocates have made of the British tribunal system (cf. Brooke, 1979)» 
What these critiques have often failed to recognise is the integrity 
of the discourse constituting these agencies. Prophylactic solutions 
could not make sense unless the meanings of "popularity" and 
"expertise" deployed were cnanged, with vast structural repercussions, 
unless clients were constituted as a collective and the opponent was 
recognised rather than denied, unless the incident itself were consti­
tuted as an example of a relationship ratner than a uniquely caused




























































































relevant to these prophylactic concerns were to be collected. All this 
would place t.ie agencies in antagonistic - cum - instrumental relation 
with professionalised stute courts, the legitimacy of whose practices 
would now be undermined. In other words, effective prevention is not 
discursively or politically possible for these agencies: it may, how­
ever, be rhetorically invoked.
While incorporated justice agencies are concerned to deal 
with presenting issues suggestions have also been made (e.g. Nader, I9d0) 
that their purpose is in fact to legitimate their sponsoring organi­
sation (the D.B.S.S., the store, even the professionalised court 
system if they are an off shoot of this). This interpretation is con­
sistent with tue researched practices of these agencies, but there is 
a danger in relying on it because a legitimating function can be ab­
stracted from almost any set of practices. The abstractions I am 
trying to achieve in this paper are more particular, their purpose 
being to distinguish types in a theoreuicaily and politically relevant 
way. Abstracting a legitimacy function, while doubtless insightful 
and interesting, does not advance this more particular project,
viii) Accountability poses few problems for these agencies. Staff
are accountable to their employers within the framework of a bureau­
cratic hierarchy. Processing of cases is thus carried out by employees, 
often of the agency being investigated, although this is not neces­
sarily the case.
The position of members of the adjudicative panels is more 
complex. Those representing organised interests such as trades unions 
may regard themselves as accountable to the sponsoring organisation; 
experts may consider themselves accountable to their occupational 
groups. But given the method of appointment and the sociology of the 
hearing process, discussed in i) above, objective accountability is 
to the agency which established the incorporated forum. Subjective 




























































































some maverick decisions, but the trade union, the occupational group 
can rarely recall a member whom they did not appoint, and certainly 
they cannot appoint his or her substitute. Only the agency which incor­
porates tne forum can make accountability bite in these ways,
ix) It is not possible to trace a general pattern in relation to
the sources of the rules invoked and applied by these agencies. What 
is clear is that the rules to be applied are rarely public or known 
in advance, there is little autonomous elaboration of them and they 
are derived from notions of what is reasonable to which the personnel 
of the agencies subscribe. The most relevant personnel here are, as 
has been argued, the administrative staff who pre-process, construct, 
and filter the cases, who are direct employees of the incorporating 
agency, and the chairpeople, who may well directly incorporate class 
based notions of the reasonable, as Frost and Howard (1977) have 
argued. In these cases the whole elaborate structure may in fact dis­
guise an almost entirely unmediated, non-autonomous form of class 
justice. Finally, certain categories of experts may claim an autho­
ritative view in relation to what is reasonable, particularly in rela­
tion to client behaviour. In these last cases the rules governing the 
adjudication will be elaborated in quite another setting and in accor­
dance with various (but specific in each case) sets of occupational 
criteria. Their class articulations are too complex to be elaborated 
here .
What is important from this analysis is that a particular and 
changing accomodation between these diverse sources of rules will be 
made in each agency. It may not be possible even to generalise across 
types of agency, given this structure. This explains why ethnographic 
studies in this area, while the only approach which could unearth the 
rules, at tne same time have distressingly limited applicability. The 
structures are such that tney generate very particular and localised




























































































to know wiiat arguments can most effectively be used.
When these nine characteristics are reviewed simultaneously 
it can be clearly seen that from a working class standpoint, while 
collective justice is the ideal, professionalised justice is greatly 
to be preferred to either variant of incorporated justice. In pro­
fessionalised forms of adjudication the rules of evidence and the 
relatively public character of the substantive rules provide protec­
tions against the unmediated class justice which may be on offer in 
incorporated agencies.
x) The tenth characteristic is once again the internal structure
of the agency. This, as noted in the discussion of accountability, is 
hierarchic and bureaucratic as far as the permanent secretariats of 
the agencies are concerned. Work roles are likely to be segmented by 
gender, with women doing typing and initial intake (reception) work.
As indicated, the filtering work of the clerks plays a larger part 
in the processing of cases in incorporated agencies. (In professiona­
lised justice pre-trial negotiations are carried out by "professionals" 
in collective justice the aim is not to filter out cases but to collect 
all relevant examples). Thus middle class women in clerical and secre­
tarial positions may have a considerable influence.
The adjudicators themselves are formally equal with the excep­
tion of the chairperson. This formal equality has already been seen 
to bear no relation to practice.
The hierarchic structures of organisation and accountability, 
with the elaborate blurring of both at the summit, may not be neces­
sary forms of incorporated agencies, but they do reflect the essential 
ambiguity of these agencies which are both owned and free, part of the 
state (or of couimerce) yet purportedly independent, agencies for self 
criticism and agencies for self defence, agencies, essentially, for 





























































































The literature on populist forms of justice is sadly limited. 
Such as it is, it is of two broad types: there is the literature 
dealing with fascist legal theories and legal forms (e.g, Brosznat, 1981 
Haley, 1982; Kirchheliner, 19̂ *0» 1969A, 1969B; Neumann, 1957} Poulantzas
197^) and the even more scanty literature on contemporary societies 
(e.g. Hall, 1980; Ietswaart, 198 2).
Populism can be characterised as a view of society as an 
organic whole constituted by separately and independently constituted 
individuals. At one level, the society alone creates the unity among 
these individuals; at another level the unity is constituted arbitra­
rily (i.e. non theoretically) by any identifying feature which the 
populace can be persuaded to regard as relevant. Bkin colour, place of 
birth, "race", legal status (slaves, insane people versus the rest), 
"moral" behaviour, and political subjectivity have all been bases for 
distinguisiiing between in-laws and out-laws, members and Others.
Politically, attempts to resolve the paradox between separate­
ness and organic interrelatedness take the form of referenda, empha­
sising the individuation prior to aglomeration/incorporation, or mass 
demonstrations of those claiming to be or to speak for the totality, 
emphasising organicism. As is clear, these forms merely represent and 
re-state the paradox. Another typical institutional feature is the 
organic, encompassing institution midway, in topographical terms, be­
tween individual and the state.
The theory of society as whole which underpins populist forms 
of justice (and other civic expressions) is therefore diametrically 
opposed to the theory upon which collective justice is based. The 
collective form, it will be recalled, depends on a theory of society 
as constituted by fundamentally separated groups whose unity in a 
social formation depends upon tne nature of their separation. How then 




























































































argued at an economic level, since these ideologies can be shown to 
have some correspondence with econoinic/political classes (Poulantzas, 
1974)), manifested in the theory and practice of justice? 
i) In populist forms of justice the class basis of adjudication
is denied. Whether the residual professional courts are the forum, 
the police station, or the streets, the claim is made that the norms 
are those of the whole society on whose behalf the justice is being 
administered. This is different, however from the form of denial 
typical of either professional or incorporated justice. Populist justice 
does not claim to be a neutral adjudicator; rather it claims to be a 
true adjudicator. Truth, in this view, is not seen as standpoint 
specific, as in collective theories of knowledge (Gramsci, 1971 PP* 352, 
4o8, 455; Cain and Pinch, iy8l) but as unproblematic.
As both Neumann and Kirchheimer (op. cit.) pointed out so 
forcefully, judgements are given in the name of collective morality, 
to which "adjudicators" invariably claim a hot line. In the German 
situation attempts were made to embody this claim in the jurisprudential 
theory, although the internal contradictions in these arguments ulti­
mately proved irresaluble. More usually, however, the claims to 
legitiamcy on the basis of collective morality remain at the level 
of common sense.
Before these structures are analysed, however, social scien-l
tific analyses of the actual class base of these decisions should be 
presented. This appears to be even more complex than in the situations 
discussed so far. Moreover, the comparative base is more limited. What 
seems to be the case is that the class base is not apparent because 
there is a real disjunction between monopoly capital, which is the 
site of power, and its functionaries, drawn from the petit bourgeoisie, 
who achieve a quite considerable autonomy by monopolising key positions 
within the repressive state apparatuses. Poulantzas (1974) argues that 




























































































unions, youth groups etc.), but that the specific ideologies of the 
petit bourgeoisie leave s^ace for monopoly capital to function, in 
spite of the rhetoric of "status quo anti-capitalism" (ibid. p. 24l) 
which was one of the elements in the German and Italian situation of 
the 1930's. This class base is disguised not just by the believed-in- 
rhetoric, the imaginary relations, of the participants, which consti­
tute their practice, but also politically, by the fact that monopoly 
capital is no longer represented by a political party, and by a duality 
of structures within the state which undermines the apparatuses of the 
liberal state while remaining hidden. In the judicial field the rele­
vant processes here are the creation of special courts, to deal largely 
with political offences, and the delegation of either general or 
specific penal powers to a range of organisations - the military, 
employers - or administrative agencies. Private law also bacame more 
arbitrary in certain areas; in both Japan and Germany relationships 
between creditors and small debtors were dealt with auministratively, 
and titles to land in Germany and Italy apparently became less secure. 
Monopoly capital was able to achieve the certainty necessary for its 
adequate functioning by other means.
The precise structures which claimed to give voice to the 
truth in these circumstances are considered below.
An even less tractable problem is offered by the on street 
forms of "summary justice" which Ietswaart ( ly'dii) contrasts with 
"popular justice" in pre-election Argentina. 10
What could be the class base of what appears to be a mani­
festation of an under class - and popular -morality? We have two clues: 
one is the evidence of this and the otner studies cited that the 
repressive state apparatuses, in this case the army, the police, are 
controlled by the petit bourgeoisie, and function largely independently 
from monopoly capital. The other is Ietswaart's sophisticated notion 





























































































the populace (although in Argentina this was not the case) represents 
"a rather extreme form of dissociation between instances of social 
reality and their authoritative verbal descriptions" (p. l6l). As Hall
(1980) has indicated, these manifestations are media controlled, fre­
quently in their generation, and almost inevitably in their authorita­
tive representation. The class bases of these forms of justice are 
therefore disguised by the mass media's typical presentation of itself 
as universal and authoritative, or in some cases neutral. Struggles 
over the control of the media themselves are another question and a 
longer story.
The subject or client of populist justice is seen as the tota­
lity. The range of institutions claiming to speak for the whole of 
society or the good of society tends to proliferate in fascist regimes 
but populist forms, as all of the other forms analytically distin­
guished here, can also be found in varying degrees in most contempo­
rary social formations. The subject/client of populist justice present 
itself as spokesperson or people for the organic unity.
Conversely the "other side" in populist justice is conceived 
as an outsider, a non member, and therefore a threat to the organic 
unity and whether intentionally or not therefore an enemy of it. As 
indicated earlier, there is no theorisation of the Other but rather 
the random invocation and non rule governed application of negative 
definitions. The genesis of these definitions, and their availability 
within the discourse can be examined empirically in each specific case 
Whereas in collective justice the other side is a theoretically 
(objectively) identified enemy, so that the risk of such an identifi­
cation could be calculated in advance, the risk in the case of popu­
list justice can be calculated only empirically, for example following 






























































































xv The incident givxng rise to tiie judgement, in the populist
and v)
form of justice, may not necessarily be known at tiie time, and may be 
unknowable in advance-! In part this is a result of the integral unpre­
dictability referred to above. In part this is a result of the attempt 
to police morality, which becomes in the end the policing of imputed 
subjective states such as , for example, having sympathy with the 
guerillas or the communists or being a nigger lover or.... Thus the 
originating incident may occur unbeknownst to the defendant or object 
of the justice 1 It is therefore inevitable that what counts as or is 
allowable as evidence varies from case to case. As in every form of 
justice, rules of evidence and relevance are established by those 
judging, here also the subjects of the justice: in this respect popu­
list justice is closer to the two forms of incorporated justice analysed 
here than to either the collective or the professionalised form, for 
both of which types these rules can be identified tlieoretically/ob j ec- 
tively. In populist justice what counts as evidence depends upon situa­
tional exigencies and the vagaries of the stereotype in use.
vi) Outcomes in populist justice are not institutionally restricted.
They may include lynching or death mobs or ostracism or a range of less 
severe penalties. In private law, as we have seen, outcomes may be 
more benign than in the professionalised form, i.e. small debts may 
be absolved by discretion and administrative decision. What populist 
justice shares with both professionalised and incorporated forms is 
that outcomes depend on individualised characteristics, whether subjec­
tive (moral state/intention) or objective (what can she afford to pay). 
In a system of collective justice outcomes depend upon the social 
position of the individual, ana the theorised or publicly/politically 
decided requirements of tne class. Jt-opulist justice may be punitive 
in intent: such a purpose is impossible for collective justice which




























































































vii) ihe above implies that the objective of populist justice in 
its pure form is to preserve the totality and re-integrate members 
witnin it while destroying the other. This is why populist penal forms 
have the ferocious quality so frequently observed. Populist justice
is not intended to be prophylactic in the individual case. General 
deterrence of fear may, however, be an objective.
viii) populist justice forms are not accountable. Indeed, the nature 
of the organisation/non organisation (see x below) renders this inevi­
table. The totality provides legitimation for these actions, but has 
no institutional expression which could render anyone answerable for 
his or her judgements. And while accontability exists within the hier­
archic organisations of exceptional states, the discretionary space
at the top - the leader - also ensures the ultimate non-accountability 
of judicial decisions to the legitimating populace. Populist justice, 
being founded on an organicist conception of the totality, is incapable 
of being accountable, either internally or externally, to its organi­
sation or to its subject.
ix) The lack of rules or of a theory from which rules could
systematically be derived has already been noted. Insofar as rules can 
be extrapolated from relatively consistent patterns of behaviour they 
are seen to be derived from the arbitrary stereotyping constitutive of 
organicist ideologies, and the public expressions of this in the media; 
of mass communication. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning here tnat 
communication in a populist regime is necessarily "mass" as opposed to 
collective, since collectivities other than those which are conceived 
as sub-parts of the organism cannot be identified. In terms of popu­
lism's own theory of itself communicatxon must be unstructured^ expressing 
the view of the totality (altnough of course un-structure is not a 
possible concept within social theory). The theory of collective justice 




























































































1978» 1980), and thinks the politics of it in terms of a theory of
structure. In contrast, therefore, rules under such a system are both 
overtly political and objective (theoretically grounded),
x) Populist justice has a restricted institutionalisation, with
few permanent organisational roles. The structures of street justice 
are essentially fluid. In the closely related fascist forms there are 
hierarchies within repressive state apparatuses, although the summit 
of these hierarchies is constituted by a totally discretionary space. 
Thus the contradictory and dual nature of the class base of populist 
justice is reflected in the continuing contradictions between order 
and non-ordef.
Dynamic relations
Thus the class base of the judicial form, with the manner in 
which the class basis of justice is concealed, establishes the remaining 
characteristics not as necessary or inevitable, but as consistent. It 
is this conceptual consistency between the characteristics that makes 
it possible to claim that one has identified a specific type or form.
It is bourgeois legal theory which reduces the alternatives 
to professionalised justice to a single oppositional form. Discrimina­
tion in terms of the class base of these forms also makes it possible 
to choose between political strategies. Indeed, the diagram is intended 
to be capable of being used as a kind of check list, so that it can be 
readily seen how closely any particular agency approximates to the 
collective justice model. The respects in which would be collective 
justice agencies differ from the model will at least provide a basis 
for reflection, and a self aware decision as to whether change is neces­
sary. More realistic and refined evaluation of strategy in relation 
to agencies of other types should also be possible. And most important, 
collective justice agencies will have the beginnings of an elaborated 





























































































As suggested, empirically these four recognisable abstracted 
types of justice most frequently co-exist in capitalist society. The 
class struggle which continuously defines and re-defines the distinc­
tions between tî em is a process which produces many forms, or at least 
elements of tnem, in any social formation. These complex struggles 
may be simplified for analytical purposes into conflicts over legiti­
macy and conflicts over resources.
At present in capitalist societies collective justice is the 
most unstable and vulnerable form. This is endemic in its pre-figurative 
character. A pre-figurative institution exists in advance of the class 
forces which could sustain its fully developed form, although of course 
its very existence pre-supposes a sufficient base of working class 
power. Secondly, pre-figurative institutions are necessarily experi­
mental. As materialist theory denies both the possibility of conceiving 
blue-prints for the future and the adequacy of existing models, experi­
mental structures attempting to express class interests and to formu­
late visions of how life might be are all that is possible. Thus 
pre-figurative institutions, or collective justice institutions in this 
case, lack a fully developed theory of their being. This renders them 
intellectually vulnerable. This is why an enterprise such as this one, 
an attempt to construct their concept, is also an attempt to contri­
bute to their viability.
Collective justice forms are thus at risk of being professiona­
lised, as a response to the legitimacy problem, or incorporated, as a 
response to the resource problem. Recent British examples illustrate 
this point (Royal Commission on Legal Services, 198 0, cli. 8 esp.).
First a number of local authority and central government fun­
ded law centres anci advice agencies have been urged or required to 
abandon collective work in favour of dealing with individual cases 




























































































only because of the resource dependence, but also because professiona­
lised justice still has a monopoly of legitimacy in British society, 
largely as a result of the organised strength of practicing lawyers. 
Class theory lacks legitimacy in a society accustomed (until 1979) 
to consensus politics. Defences therefore have to be expressed in terms 
of help for the poor or underprivileged. However, these categories 
(the poor etc.) are not derived from a class theoretic analysis but 
from an analysis concerned with a continuous hierarchy of "life chances". 
There is thus a theoretical inconsistency in claims that the only 
way to help "the poor" is by collective action, for the necessity of 
a collective approach is derived from a theory of discontinuous and 
qualitatively different classes. The theoretical weakness in collective 
justice agencies' presentation of themselves enhances their ideologi­
cal vulnerability. This difficulty will be exacerbated in any society 
with (l) a strongly organised £jrofession and (a) a lack of left resis­
tance to consensus politics. In this situation it is difficult for these 
pre-figurative agencies to present an acceptable account of themselves.
On the resource front, law centres in Britain are vulnerable 
to closure as the price of non-conformity. Three centres in Wandsworth, 
for example, were closed in 19&1 when the local authority changed 
hands. But they are also - and this is more sinsiter - vulnerable to 
incorporation. The Royal Commission on Legal Services recommended pre­
cisely such an incorporation within the central state. Fortunately the 
Conservative government was not interested in developing this proposal. 
It is not clear how law centres, eitiier collectively in the Law Centres 
Federation or individually^ would have responded to this promise of a 
financially secure future.
In addition to these endemic risks, popular justice forms are 
vulnerable when tney direcly challenge the existing state, presenting 
themselves as alternative authorities. Morrison (1 9 7 5) has described 




























































































by the Mounted Police; the Portuguese forms described by Sousa Santos 
(l979) have been supplanted. On the other hand, if the state is weak 
or unstable these alternative sites may coexist with it over extended 
periods, as in Latin America.
Professionalised justice, as the dominant capitalist form, has
few legitimacy and no resource problems. The main legitimacy challenge
comes to it from the working class, and from collective justice forms,
which respectively argue and demonstrate that professionalised justice
is "out of touch" witii working class norms and standards. Priestley
11(19 6 2) gave perhaps the most cogent and witty account of this.
So far, however, there have been few signs that professionalised justice 
itself is either threatened by or capable of responding to this 
challenge.
however the main contribution of professionalised justice to 
the dynamic relations between these forms is an imperialist one, pur­
porting to take over not only collective justice (which would be a 
retrogressive step) but also incorporated justice (which would be pro­
gressive). It is partly for this reason - the dependence of one's 
evaluation of an expansion of professionalised justice on a particu­
lar analysis - that it has been necessary to draw the distinctions 
presented here. When it is argued (Brooke, 1979i Frost and Howard, 19775 
Reich, 1964) that clients of state forms of incorporated justice 
should be constituted as subjects with rights, that rules governing 
the decisions should be public and consistent and, thirdly, (only) 
capable of being argued by professional representatives, that other 
aspects of the discourse - characterisation of the originating inci­
dent, rules of evidence - be similarly accommodated to the "profes­
sional" legal model, then these changes should be encouraged, although 
the third is problematic because it supports tiie unnecessary monopoly 
position of a particualr occupational group. Professionalised justice 




























































































form could be, since incorporated forms create a site for the direct 
penetration of dominant class norms.
Incorporated forms of justice are vulnerable to encroachment 
from each of the other three forms, as a result of their lack of a con­
sistent legitimating ideology. On the other hand, the very fact of 
their incorporation indicates that as long as they continue to fulfill 
their objective they are not going to encounter resource difficulties.
The legitimacy problem for incorporated forms posed by col­
lective justice results from the dual legitimation of tnese forms in 
terms of their "lay" element and their "expert" element. First, these 
two forms of legitimation cannot function simultaneously. There is thus 
an internal contradiction in the ideological structure which is it­
self a source of weakness. Yet both elements - the lay and the expert - 
are used to justify the departure from professionalised justice, the 
form, as has been stated, which undoubtedly carries highest legitimacy 
in contemporary western capitalist societies. The problem of the in­
ternal contradiction arises because of the scientific truth claims 
made by and particularly about experts. Because if there is a person 
who can directly divine the truth of a claim or a situation then there 
is no .need for a court of adjudicators at all. Their only function 
could be to reinforce the truth, which is unnecessary, or to subvert 
it. On the other hand a decision by an expert alone is plainly not 
regarded as adequate. Fiany experts - planners, welfare officials - do 
not carry wide popular legitimacy. Therefore the present two tiered 
legitimacy structure is more effective. The incorporated justice agency 
claims legitimacy from the outside world by virtue of being "lay" or 
popular, while a pattern of acceptable decisions is legitimated inter­
nally, to the lay members, by virtue of being experts.
However this structurally useful device creates a second legi­
timacy problem, apart from that of internal consitency. It's lay mem­




























































































easily be rendered suspect, ^hus the class base, the organisation, and
the procedures of incorporated justice can be directly challenged by*
collective justice forms, which are a living demonstration of what 
"lay justice" might become. An analysis of the practice of these insti­
tutions also reveals and explains the typical subject-object inversion 
presented above, so that their legitimacy can be challenged on the 
grounds of blaming the victim.
The challenge to incorporated justice from the professionalised 
form has already been considered, and it has been argued that this 
challenge;, as well as the collective one, should be encouraged. How 
then is incorporated justice vulnerable to the worst form of all, from 
a working class standpoint, namely populist justice?
As far as the distinction between populist justice - which 
can also be seen as fully incorporated -, and state or capital incor­
porated forms is concerned, while the class base is largely the same, 
it is concealed in different ways. These ideological differences affect 
the way subjects and objects of justice can be conceived. They also 
structure the nature of possible objectives, leading not just to dif­
ferences in procedure but to dramatically different outcomes. Indeed 
the fact that in incorporated forms the constituted subject is effec­
tively the victim, that there may be a subject-object inversion, is 
grounds for challenge. In populists forms, however, the victim in the 
matter is the object of the justice. And of course, the populist forms 
can therefore be far more punitive. These differences are constituted 
by and in part re-constitute the different political structures and 
balance of forces between the classes of the society. The conceptual 
consequences of the ideology could not be fully elaborated into a 
"form of justice" if tiiere were organised class resistance on both 
ideological and political fronts, (for control of the ideological and 




























































































Incorporated justice is, however, vulnerable to populist forms 
because from the point of view of the state and capital the legitima­
ting lay element may mean that these agencies give unwelcome decisions. 
At least the possibility exists. The response to the chailege from 
collective forms on even professionalised forms may then be a movement 
towards greater incorporation, and total control. T h i s t h e  organi­
sational (rather than the on-street) manifestation of populism at its 
anti democratic extreme.
The best historical example of precisely this series of shifts 
has been offered by Keifner (19&2) in his powerful account of how 
Workers' Offices (collective justice forms) in pre-fascist Germany 
were first incorporated as government sponsored law-offices, and then 
finally absorbed into the fascist totality. This is why professionalised 
justice forms are essential to the working class at defensive moments 
in their struggle: they are resistant to incorporation without massive
organisational and ideological re-structuring, as Thompson (1975) so 
forcefully pointed out.
Is the continuum a circle? Or what is the relationship between 
populist and collective forms? This essay has shown that they are not 
just diagramatically but also conceptually and politically poles apart. 
There seems to be no real risk of collectivism degenerating (from a 
class standpoint it is possible to use such an evaluative term) into 
populism. In the western world it has never happened, or ever been on 
the cards. And can populism become collective? It is of course extremely 
vulnerable to legitimacy challenges from both collective and profes­
sionalised forms. If these become sufficient then the structural rift 
between monopoly capital as financier and the petit bourgeoisie which 
controls the state may cause a dramatic lurch back towards profession­
alised forms* But here we are talking of a class struggle and the 
balance of class forces in particular situations, not of relations 




























































































resource claims and deficits are effective only if political action 
makes them so. An analysis of this kind can provide some indicators 
of the directions for political action: it cannot substitute for it.
And successful working class political action would render it obsolete, 
for like all material analyses, its truth-claims are temporally 
bounded.
Tail Note
This paper has not discussed forms of justice in most parts of 
the third world. China, or in Eastern Europe. And surely enough, quantit­
atively, has been said. None the less, a few comments may be in order.
First, the third world: it is noteworthy that models of adju­
dication in third world countries which have been recommended for im­
portation have been pre-capitalist ones (Christie, 1977* Danzig, 1973) 
rather than those generated in the course of the on-going struggle 
against imperialism (Karst, 1973* Rojas, 198 2; Sachs, J.98O, Spence, 1983 
Santos, 1979* 1980; Thome, 1979* 19&1* 1984). As I and many others 
have already argued (Cain, 198a and see p. ) institutions cannot be 
transplanted from one mode of production to another witnout transfor­
mation. This notion was only ever possible because of a lack of an 
adequate concept of tiieih or tiieir process. Moreover, the premises of 
that discussion were empirically false since pre-capitalist justice 
forms were and are endemically unequal and heavily gendered (Merry,
19 8 3* op. cit.).
The Latin American examples which we have, however, exemplify 
insitutions born out of struggle against imperialist capitalist forms. 
They can be accommodated within our pre-figurative model of collective 
justice. 4 Indeed, they fit almost exactly, although (l) a major diffe­
rence, noted in the general discussion of collective forms, is that 
they are frequently concerned with internal co-ordination and defence 




























































































on status hierarcnies within the subject group. It may therefore 
appear less democratic, until one recalls that status (unlike class) 
is redeemable: this is the informally institutionalised basis of 
accountability. ive can learn from these models too.
Tixe models from "socialist" countries are so various tuat it
(1975)
is difficult to draw their lesson although Gordley/has attempted to 
generalise. And apart from the variation, there is the major difference 
of the role of the party. This might involve expanding the presently 
diadic notion of incorporation by either the state or capital to in­
clude the possibility of incorporation by the party. Ana any attempt 
to analyse this from a working class standpoint would involve both a 
theory of the party and a detailed empirical knowledge of the state 
of these party-class relations in each of the societies in question. 
This paper is not the place to examine these questions, however, a 
number of other observations may be made.
In Cuba (Cantor, 1974), Maoist China (Brady, 198O, 1982;
hipkin, 1980) and Yugoslavia (Jambrek, 198 3) there have been recent 
party sponsored attempts to make justice closer to the life of the 
people. (It is less confusing to reserve the term collective for the 
pre-figurative capitalist forms discussed here). In both China and 
Yugoslavia the risk to these forms is from a re-professionalisation.
In China this seems to be associated with a change in class composi­
tion within the party and a wish to import capital; in Yugoslavia the 
pressure comes more directly from lawyers, but the direction of the 
outcome is less clear. In neither of these countries is a greater 
degree of incorporation - of any kind - proposed or apparent.
Social scientific data are available too about the Comrades* 
Courts in Bulgaria (Naumova, 1983)» (pre Solidarity) Poland (Kurcewski 
and Frieske, 1 9 7 8; Kurcewski, 1979)» and about lay assessors in 
Hungary (Kulcsar, 1^82). It seem that in these cases the party has a 




























































































question of forging accountability to the communal subject remains 
important. The subject/object inversion characteristic of incorporated 
forms is therefore a danger here. All one can say, periiaps, is that 
incorporation by a party, and most particularly by one which is not 
organically related and accountable to the class it represents, would 
be no improvement on any other kind of incorporation, and one stage 
worse from a class standpoint than professionalised justice.
If this leaves us stuck for "finished" models we snould re­
member how long it took for workable capitalist forms to emerge, that 
the first capitalist republic, for example, (Cromwell's) was scrapped 
as a failed experiment, and an impossible political form, and that 
there are unfinished models of a state which empowers the people 
(Hall, l*iH) and of sites of judgment which transform justice without 




























































































(1) Santos elaborated his grounds for hope in an earlier (1979) paper.
(2) See also Cain and Finch (1980, 1 9 8 1) and Keat (1 9 8 1), for discus­
sions of these kinds of positions.
(3 ) This discussion owes much in general terms, to Foucault's discus­
sion of repressed histories and experiences. See Foucault (l977)> 
pp. 205-217•
(4) And again, a general and permanent debt to Gramsci must be acknow­
ledged here, in particular, of course, to his theory of knowledge 
(see Gramsci 197l)i and within that in particular his theories of 
the intellectuals and of hegemony.
(5) Source^pilot research conducted in 1979 by the author, and finan­
ced by the Nuffield Foundation.
(b) Me Barnet (l97b, 1 9 8 1) has revealed how legal rules, and in parti­
cular the discretionary spaces which they create, shape the work 
of police, prosecutors, and criminal courts. The same is true in 
private law (see Cain, 1979: report to the Nuffield Foundation on 
pilot study of County Courts, Appendix B).
(7 ) This form is not, of course, unproblematic. Jessop, (1983) provi­
des the most useful summary of the debates in tnis area.
(8) Caroline Goodman-Jones has revealed the ambiguity of the status 
of experts when used as witnesses in a recent Ph. D. (University 
of Cambridge, 1984). Joel Bigen (University of Philadelpnia) has 
documented the historical emergence of tne psychological expert 
witness in Bnglish l8tn and 19th century trials. Private commu­
nication.
(9) there are of course except! ods. As ^laprer (i.979) and uogowski v i 9 b ‘■i) 
Suow, some labour courts in ^.articular resist incorporation of this 
Kind, e.ost notably in France all adjudicators of the conseils des 
proud'hommes are elected directly by members of either trades 
unions or employers' organisations.*.
(10) Ietswaart's distinction here provided the seminal thought giving 
rise to this paper- a considerable debt which must be acknowledged.
(11) See Cain (1976, I979t 1984) for discussions of why law necessarily
has the form of a meta-discourse, and why it is structurally impos­
sible for tnis discourse to originate in the working class.
(12) Legal aid models are not pre-figurative in the sense used here.
They do not. decide issues, but rather filter cases to professio­
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